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This paper surveys the literature on the effects of capital account openness and
stock market liberalization on economic growth and provides a synthesis in which
we reconcile some of the different results presented in the literature. Various empir-
ical measures used to gauge the presence of controls on capital account transactions
and the liberalization of equity markets are discussed. We compare detailed mea-
sures of capital account controls that attempt to capture the intensity of enforcement
with other indicators that simply capture whether controls are present. A detailed
review of the literature is followed by an empirical section in which we trace the
divergence in published results to differences in country coverage, sample periods,
indicators of liberalization, and control variables across studies. Specifically, we
show that when an institutional variable such as government reputation is added
to the specification, the significance of capital account openness vanishes. Also,
we demonstrate that enriching the specification by allowing for nonlinearities
helps explain why different studies that ignore the nonlinear nature of the rela-
tionship find different results. [JEL F32, F33, F36]
E
conomic theory suggests that unfettered international capital flows can foster
a more efficient allocation of resources, provide opportunities for risk diver-
*Hali Edison is a Senior Economist in the Asia and Pacific Department of the IMF; Michael Klein is
a Professor of Economics at the Fletcher School, Tufts University; Luca Antonio Ricci is a Senior
Economist in the Research Department of the IMF; and Torsten Sløk is an Economist at the OECD. A part
of this work was used as input for Chapter 4 of the IMF’s October 2001 World Economic Outlook. The
authors thank Tamim Bayoumi, Robert Flood, Ross Levine, Dennis Quinn, and Frank Warnock for com-
ments and suggestions and Yutong Li for assistance.sification, and help promote financial development. In recognition of these poten-
tial benefits, governments of industrial countries have undertaken widespread cap-
ital account liberalization over the past quarter-century. Many attribute efficiency
gains, increased diversification opportunities, and financial development in these
countries to opening up capital markets.
A natural policy prescription, therefore, is to extend this process of international
financial integration to other, economically less developed, countries.1 But this view
has been quite controversial. Some argue that, while capital account liberalization
is desirable, it is important to proceed slowly.2 Others question the desirability of
unfettered capital flows regardless of the liberalization process on the grounds that
unregulated capital flows could facilitate the occurrence and spread of currency
crises.3 Given the potential importance of countries’policies on capital account lib-
eralization and the different lessons one might draw based on which articles one
reads in this expanding literature, it seems an opportune time to review the evidence.
One source of the debate on the role of capital account liberalization is the
mixed set of empirical results derived in the literature. A possible reason for this
ambiguity arises from the fact that different studies have applied different empiri-
cal measures, reflecting the difficulty in identifying and quantifying capital account
liberalization in a consistent manner across a wide set of countries. In Section I of
this survey, we describe a range of different measures of capital account openness.
We  also demonstrate that the two measures that have been most widely used in
studies of the effects of capital account liberalization on growth, one that attempts
to capture the intensity of controls and another that merely records their presence,
paint a roughly similar picture of the state of capital account controls.
While the correlation across these two measures may not strike one as surpris-
ing, we show in our review of the literature in Section II that studies employing the
indicator that attempts to capture the intensity with which controls are imposed
tend to be more supportive of the effect of open capital accounts on growth than
those that employ an indicator of the presence or absence of controls. One might
suspect that this is because of the fact that indicators reflecting intensity are more
informative than ones that merely record the presence or absence of controls. This
conclusion, however, ignores the fact that studies vary widely along several dimen-
sions, including the time period and country coverage of the sample, as well as the
econometric technique employed.
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1The benefits of open capital markets were stressed by Lawrence Summers in his 2000 Richard T. Ely
Lecture to the American Economic Association when he said “. . . to the extent that international financial
integration represents an improvement in financial intermediation, . . . [perhaps] because institutions
involved in the transfer of capital across jurisdictions improve efficiency with which capital is allocated, it
offers a potentially significant increase in economic efficiency” (p. 3).
2For example, in the Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial
Committee on Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System and Reform
of the IMF (IMF, September 19, 2000; available via the Internet at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/
2000/02/report.htm) it is written, “In a number of discussions in recent years on issues related to capital
account issues, the Executive Board has emphasized the substantial benefits of capital account liberalization,
but stressed the need to carefully manage and sequence liberalization in order to minimize risks.”
3In an influential article in Foreign Affairs, Bhagwati (1998, p. 7) argued that “substantial gains [from
capital account liberalization] have been asserted, not demonstrated.... ”In an effort to assess the reasons for the different conclusions obtained across
studies, we present, in Section III, a series of regressions in which we use a common
data set and a common set of “nuisance” regressors to focus on the role played by
the sample and the type of capital account openness indicator in generating diverse
results. We are able to replicate the basic result, with respect to the significance of
capital account openness and stock market liberalization on growth, presented in five
published studies by mimicking the country coverage, time period studied, and indi-
cator of capital account openness employed in these research papers.
The purpose of Section III, however, is not replication but cross-study compar-
ison. We show that all the specifications in which there is a significant effect of cap-
ital account openness on economic growth founder on the same shoal. Rodrik
(1998) suggests that capital account openness may only serve as a proxy for the
reputation of a government. Indeed, when he includes both an indicator of capi-
tal account openness and a measure of government reputation in a growth regres-
sion, the coefficient on the latter is positive and highly significant, while the
coefficient on the former is not at all significant. We show that this criticism holds
for samples with different time periods and country coverage than those considered
by Rodrik as well as for regressions that employ other indicators of capital account
openness or stock market liberalization.
We also present evidence in Section III supporting the hypothesis that capital
account openness and stock market liberalization might have a positive effect on
some countries’ growth, even when we control for government reputation. Follow-
ing Klein (2003), we use a specification in which there is a quadratic interaction
between income per capita and capital account openness or stock market liberaliza-
tion. Replicating his results, we demonstrate that there is a positive and significant
effect of capital account openness and stock market liberalization on economic
growth for middle-income countries but not for poor or rich countries. This result is
consistent with the view that poorer countries do not have the legal, social, and polit-
ical institutions necessary to fully enjoy the benefits of capital account liberalization.
We conclude, in Section IV, with the lessons we have drawn from our survey
and synthesis, as well as our suggestions for further research on this timely and
important topic.
I. Measures of Capital Account Restrictions
A natural starting point for any data-based discussion of the consequences of cap-
ital account openness and stock market liberalization on growth is a review of dif-
ferent empirical measures that have been employed to gauge whether a country
allows the free flow of financial capital across its borders. In practice, there are
few indicators of capital account restrictions available across a wide cross section
of countries. Most measures are qualitative and rules-based, though there has been
some attempt to go beyond an on/off categorization by reflecting the intensity with
which controls are imposed.
In this section, we discuss in detail the two capital account restriction mea-
sures used widely in studies of the growth effects of financial liberalization. Both
of these measures draw on data assembled by the IMF and published annually
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tions (AREAER). We compare these two measures both with each other and with
some other measures of capital account openness. Then we present some alterna-
tive methods of dating stock market liberalization and highlight other quantitative
measures of capital account liberalization.
Table 1 summarizes the measures of capital account liberalization and stock
market liberalizations. This summary table facilitates the comparison of the indi-
cators discussed in this section. Each row of this table corresponds to one of the
indicators. The first column presents the name of the indicator that we will use in
our discussion of growth determinants. The second column provides the source of
the indicator, referring either to an article where the indicator is first presented or
to a publication that describes the construction of the indicator. Columns 3 through
6 briefly describe the indicator, the range of values the indicator takes, the years
covered, and the countries covered by the indicator.
Indicators of Capital Account Openness
Every issue of the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions published between 1967 (which refers to
conditions in 1966) and 1996 (which refers to conditions in 1995) includes a sum-
mary table in which a single row directly addresses the presence of capital controls,
line E.2, labeled “Restrictions on payments for capital transactions.”4 The informa-
tion in this row has been the basis for generating an indicator of the existence of
rules or restrictions that inhibit cross-border capital flows or discriminate on the
basis of citizenship or residence of transacting agents (Table 1, row 1).
Share measure
A standard way to use the information from line E.2 of the International Monetary
Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions is to
construct, for each country, a variable reflecting the proportion of years in which
countries had liberalized capital accounts. We call this variable Share (Table 1,
row 2).5 For example, if the AREAER judged capital markets open for 5 years out
of a 10-year period, then the openness measure Share would be 0.5.
A potential problem with this approach is that a value of Share equal to 0.5 is
consistent with a situation where a country had open capital markets for the first
five years of a decade, for the last five years of a decade, for every other year of a
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4The set of categories that reflect the presence of capital controls expanded with the 1997 issue of
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions with the specification of 13 cate-
gories including, for the first time, a distinction between restrictions on inflows and restrictions on outflows.
Unfortunately, this modification of the classification system introduces a structural break in the measure,
since the two classification methodologies (one entry versus 13 entries) cannot easily be mapped onto each
other. We do not discuss the expanded categorization in the post-1996 AREAER, since we know of no
research on capital account liberalization that has used data spanning these two classification systems.
5The first work to employ such a data set—and generate a publicly available electronic version—was
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995). Other research using such measures includes Rodrik (1998) and Klein
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Table 2. IMF Capital Account Restriction Measure
A. Value of Share and Years When Capital Markets Open, 1986–95
(For countries that had open markets at some point in time, i.e., Share ≠ 0)
Proportion 
of Years Years Open Industrial Countries Developing Countries
0.1 1995 Norway Costa Rica, Niger
0.2 1994–95 Spain Trinidad & Tobago
0.3 1993–95 Portugal, Sweden Honduras, Peru
0.4 1992–95 Ireland
0.5 1991–95 Finland, Austria





1.0 1986–95 Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Indonesia,





B. The Evolution of Capital Account Restrictions, 1976–85
(For countries that had open markets at some point during this period)
Years Open Industrial Countries Years Open Developing Countries
1984–85 Australia, New Zealand 1980–81 Costa Rica
1978–85 Japan, United Kingdom 1976–79 Guatemala, Honduras
1976–84 Ecuador
1976–85 Belgium, Canada, 1976–85 Indonesia, Malaysia
Germany, Netherlands,
United States
Sources: IMF, AREAER; and Klein and Olivei (1999).
decade, or for many other on-again, off-again patterns. In practice, however, as
shown in Panel A of Table 2 (Klein and Olivei, 1999), there are very few instances
of on-again, off-again capital account controls, at least for the 10-year period that
ends in 1995, the last year in which capital account liberalization reflects the entry
in a single line of the AREAER. Thus, over the period 1986 to 1995, a country with
a value of Share equal to 0.1 had an open capital account in 1995 only, a country
with a value of Share equal to 0.2 had an open capital account in 1994 and 1995,
and so on. This pattern holds for all industrial countries and for 10 of the 12 devel-
oping countries that had some experience with open capital accounts during this
period. Panel B of this table shows that this correspondence between the value of
Share and the number of continuous years of open capital accounts continues to
hold for industrial countries as the sample period is extended back to 1976. But, inthis longer sample period, there are many more cases of on-again, off-again capital
account liberalization among developing countries.
Quinn’s measure
The on/off indicator of capital controls presented in the summary table of the Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions described above does
not distinguish between strongly administered capital controls and those that are
somewhat more porous. Quinn (1997) attempts to capture the intensity of enforce-
ment of controls on both the capital account and the current account through a care-
ful reading of the narrative descriptions in the AREAER (Table 1, row 3).6
We limit our discussion to Quinn’s measures of capital account liberalization.7
He scores the intensity of controls for capital account receipts and capital account
payments separately. For each of these two categories, a score of 0 indicates pay-
ments are forbidden, 0.5 indicates that there are quantitative or other regulatory
restrictions, 1 indicates that transactions are subject to heavy taxes, 1.5 indicates
that there are less severe taxes, and 2 indicates that transactions are free of restric-
tions or taxes. The sum of the values for the two categories is an indicator of over-
all capital account openness that ranges between 0 and 4. These indicators are
available annually from 1950–97 for 21 Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries and for the years 1958, 1973, 1982, and 1988
for 43 non-OECD countries.
A glance at Quinn’s data set indicates that the overall trend toward liberaliza-
tion is mostly driven by the OECD countries. Table 3 presents a tabulation of
Quinn’s measure of capital account liberalization for 1973, 1982, and 1988, years
for which these indicators are available for all countries. The top panel of this table
presents the data for the full set of 63 countries, while the lower panel presents the
data for the 42 non-OECD countries only. The data in the first set of columns of
these tables show that, in 1973, 37 of 63 countries, including 26 of the 42 devel-
oping countries, had capital account indicators equal to the mid-range (2) or lower.
The overall trend toward greater capital account liberalization is reflected in the
fact that, from 1973 to 1988, the total number of countries with capital account
indicators equal to 2 or lower decreased to 33. But this overall trend hides signif-
icant heterogeneity: over the same period the number of developing countries with
a score of 2 or lower actually increased to 32.
As discussed in more detail below, Quinn (1997) uses the change in the value of
the indicator of capital account restrictions rather than its level in his growth regres-
sions (Table 1, row 4). The last three columns of each of the two panels in Table 3
uncover interesting patterns in the churning of the capital account liberalization
experience. While most OECD countries (18 out of 21) increased their degree of lib-
eralization between 1973 and 1988, the developing countries were almost equally
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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6Two people separately assigned scores based on their readings of the narrative descriptions, and then
these scores were checked for discrepancies.
7Quinn also scores the intensity of controls for two categories that are related to current account
restrictions and another category called international legal agreements.split between those that increased it (15 countries), reduced it (12), or kept it
unchanged (15). Note also that by the end of the 1980s, developing countries had
converged toward an intermediate level of liberalization; developing countries that
had a relatively low level of liberalization in 1973 tended toward an increase in this
measure, while the opposite held for those developing countries with a relatively
high degree of liberalization in 1973.
Quinn’s capital account restriction indicators are meant to be used as cardinal
numbers, and, therefore, there is the implication that a country in category 2 is liter-
ally twice as unfettered as one in category 1, or a change in the value of the indi-
cator of 1 is exactly twice the amount of liberalization as a change in the indicator
of 0.5. For comparison purposes, however, the question arises of how to convert
Hali J.Edison,Michael W.Klein,Luca Antonio Ricci,and Torsten Sløk
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Table 3. Quinn’s Indicators of Capital Account Liberalization
Number of Overall Countries
With No  With  With 
Change Increase  Decrease 
in Value  in Value  in Value 
Indicator Value 1973 1982 1988 1973–88 1973–88 1973–88
0 (restricted) 2 1 0 0 2 —
0.5 453 1 3 0
1.0 11 9 7 4 6 1
1.5 13 151 4 6 6 1
2.0 7 13 9 0 6 1
2.5 746 2 4 1
3.0 9 7 11 2 4 3
3.5 504 0 2 3
4.0 (liberalized) 5 9 9 3 — 2
TOTAL 636 36 3 1 8 3 3 1 2
Number of Developing (Non-OECD) Countries
With No  With  With 
Change Increase  Decrease 
in Value  in Value  in Value 
Indicator Value 1973 1982 1988 1973–88 1973–88 1973–88
0 (restricted) 2 1 0 0 2 —
0.5 453 1 6 0
1.0 10 8 7 4 5 1
1.5 9 14 13 6 2 1
2.0 189 0 0 1
2.5 513 2 2 1
3.0 402 0 1 3
3.5 302 0 0 3
4.0 (liberalized) 4 5 3 2 — 2
TOTAL 424 24 2 1 5 1 5 1 2
Sources: Quinn (1997) and authors’ calculations.CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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Table 4. Comparison of Quinn and IMF Indicators
(Number of countries for each combination of indicators)
Panel 1: Full Sample:Year 1973
IMF Indicator
01 T o t a l
Quinn 0–2 36 0 36
Indicator 2.5–4 10 15 25
Total 46 15 61
Panel 2: Full Sample:Year 1982
IMF Indicator
01 T o t a l
Quinn 0–2 38 4 42
Indicator 2.5–4 7 12 19
Total 45 16 61
Panel 3: Full Sample:Year 1988
IMF Indicator
01 T o t a l
Quinn 0–2 32 0 32
Indicator 2.5–4 12 17 29
Total 44 17 61
Panel 4: Developing Countries:Year 1973
IMF Indicator
01 T o t a l
Quinn 0–2 26 0 26
Indicator 2.5–4 4 12 16
Total 30 12 42
Panel 5: Developing Countries:Year 1982
IMF Indicator
01 T o t a l
Quinn 0–2 32 4 36
Indicator 2.5–4 0 6 6
Total 32 10 42
Panel 6: Developing Countries:Year 1988
IMF Indicator
01 T o t a l
Quinn 0–2 32 0 32
Indicator 2.5–4 2 8 10
Total 34 8 42
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Quinn’s measure into a (0,1) dummy; that is, how to identify which value of Quinn’s
scale would correspond to a threshold for classifying countries as open or closed.
Table 4 suggests that the correspondence between Quinn’s multiple-measures
and the 0/1 AREAER measure is approximately achieved if one chooses a threshold
of 2 in Quinn’s scale. Each of the six panels in this table offers a tabulation of the
number of countries that have capital accounts classified as 0 (closed) or 1 (open) by
the  AREAER and are given values of capital account restrictions of 0–2 (more
closed) or 2.5–4 (more open) by Quinn. There are three panels for the full sample
and three for developing countries, with one pair for each of the more recent years
for which Quinn has data for all countries, 1973, 1982, and 1988. A high corre-
spondence between the AREAER and Quinn measures would be reflected in rela-
tively large diagonal elements of the 2 × 2 matrix and relatively small off-diagonal
elements. In fact, more than 80 percent of the countries in the full sample and more
than 90 percent of the countries in the developing countries sample fall into one of
the diagonal cells for each of the three years. For the full sample, there are few cases
where the AREAER indicates open capital accounts while Quinn indicates closed
capital accounts (that is, it is rare to find a relatively large number in the upper-rightcell of the 2 × 2 matrix). Most of the discrepancies between the two indicators
are cases where the AREAER indicates closed capital accounts and Quinn gives
a value of 2.5, 3, 3.5, or 4. A more detailed presentation would show that almost
all the cases of non-zero entries in the lower-left cell represent a value of 2.5 or
3 assigned by Quinn.
Thus, there seems to be quite a high correspondence between Quinn’s measures
and those of the AREAER, when one chooses a threshold of 2 in Quinn’s scale in
order to classify a country’s capital account as closed or open. The relevant ques-
tion is whether the gradations presented by Quinn offer significant information, a
point we return to below.
OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements
An alternative measure of capital account liberalization, one available only for
OECD member countries, is provided in various issues of the Code of Liberaliza-
tion of Capital Movements published by the OECD about every other year (Table 1,
row 5).8 Each volume of the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements offers
data on the extent to which restrictions contemporaneously apply on a range of types
of international transactions, including direct investment, liquidation of direct invest-
ment, admission of securities to capital markets, buying and selling of securities,
buying and selling of collective investment securities, operations in real estate, finan-
cial credits and loans, and personal capital movements. The OECD also specifies
whether the restrictions apply to commercial banks and other credit institutions, and
to institutional investors.
In all, the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements reports on whether there
are restrictions on 11 categories of capital account transactions. Klein and Olivei
(1999) construct a variable that represents the proportion of these 11 categories that
are free of restrictions, averaged over time. Thus, this variable (like the Share vari-
able described above) potentially ranges from 0 to 1 over the sample period but
(unlike Share) its value for any one country in any year can take a value between 0
and 1 in increments of 1/11. For the period 1986 to 1995, the four largest values for
this variable are 0.89 (Germany), 0.92 (United States), 0.92 (Netherlands), and 0.93
(United Kingdom), while two countries have values below one-half, Greece (0.49)
and Portugal (0.43). The correlation between this measure and the IMF Share mea-
sure using the single annual 0/1 measures drawn from AREAER is 0.86.
Montiel-Reinhart intensity measure
In a series of papers, Montiel and Reinhart develop and use an alternative measure
of intensity of controls on international transactions based on annual information
for 15 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic,
Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and
Uganda) for the period 1990–96.9 This indicator ranges from 0 to 2, and, unlike
Hali J.Edison,Michael W.Klein,Luca Antonio Ricci,and Torsten Sløk
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8Between 1986 and 1995, these volumes were published in March 1986, March 1988, November
1990, June 1993, and June 1995.
9See, for example, Montiel (1996), and Montiel and Reinhart (1999).the measures previously discussed, a higher number represents stronger capital
account restrictions. In particular, a value of 0 for a particular country in a partic-
ular year represents a situation where “no restrictions or taxes were imposed on
capital inflows and no restrictions on the domestic indebtedness of domestic finan-
cial institutions were in place that appeared to be in excess of commonly used pru-
dential measure.”10 A value of 1 represents restrictions that take the form of
“overzealous prudential regulations (such as strict limits on the foreign exchange
exposure of banks)” while a value of 2 indicates “the existence of explicit mea-
sures, such as prohibitions, deposit requirements, or financial transaction taxes,
designed to limit capital flows” (Table 1, row 6). The choice of assigning a value
of 0, 1, or 2 for a particular country in a particular year is based on information
provided in the annual report of that country’s central bank.
Each of the 15 countries in their sample begins with a value of 0 for the capital
control proxy in 1990. Ten countries retain a value of 0 throughout the 1990–
96 period, and five countries end the period with a value of 2. More to the point for
this discussion, the only instance of an intermediate value of 1 is for Colombia in
1991 and 1992, after which it switches to 2 for 1993–96. Thus, their effort to distin-
guish between the intensity of capital controls does not really yield many cases
where “mild” capital controls are in place. In particular, were these data used to con-
struct “shares” over the period 1990–96, there would be little difference between
using the range of values 0, 1, and 2, or using only 0 and 1.11
Indicators of Stock Market Liberalization
Several papers have focused on the liberalization of controls on the international
sale or purchase of equities. Research in this area has typically focused on dating
the opening of equity markets to foreign investors. Levine and Zervos (1998) and
Henry (2000a, 2000b), who extended this work, have compiled dates from a vari-
ety of sources, including The Wilson Directory of Emerging Market Funds, the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) Investable Indexes, various issues of The
Economist Intelligence Unit, and the IMF’s AREAER. For instance, for each of the
11 countries in his sample, Henry uses the dates reflecting official policy decrees
as the first date in which a country fund is available, or a 10-percentage point jump
in the IFC Investable Index (Table 1, row 7).12
Bekaert (1995) and Bekaert and Harvey (1995) also determine dates when
equity markets in emerging economies opened to foreign investors based on a vari-
ety of indicators, including Official Liberalization Dates, the date of the introduction
of American Depository Receipts, the date of the introduction of country funds, and
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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10All the quotes in this paragraph are from Montiel and Reinhart (1999, notes to Table 3, p. 628).
11Montiel and Reinhart also provide a “sterilization index” that is scored 0, 1, or 2 and that has many
more cases of intermediate values than does the capital control proxy.
12For a description of his method, see the discussion on page 533 of Henry (2000a). Table I in this paper
(p. 534) lists the dates and Table II compares these dates with those used by other authors. This paper is
available on his web page, which also contains a document that lists major policy events, drawn from vari-
ous issues of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Quarterly Economic Report, “Appendix 1: Chronological
Listing of Major Policy Events in Developing Countries.” Available via the Internet at: http://faculty-
gsb.stanford.edu/henry/personal/homepage.htm.a date estimated through a regime-switching model based on the time series of net
U.S. capital flows (see Table 1 in Bekaert and Harvey, 2000). The number of coun-
tries covered is extended in a paper by these two authors and Lundblad (2001) to
95 countries, 16 of which had liberalized stock markets over the full period 1980
to 1997 and 27 of which had some experience with stock market liberalizations
over this period. (See their Appendix Table A1; these dates are referred to in our
Table 1, row 8.)
Table 5 presents the dates of “Official International Financial Liberalization”
for the 30 countries classified as either emerging markets or frontier markets by the
International Finance Corporation, as reported by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2001). Note that, in comparing the entries in this table with the entries in Table 2,
only Indonesia and Malaysia had both equity market liberalization and capital
account liberalization (as reported by the IMF in the AREAER), and equity market
liberalization followed capital account liberalization for both of these countries.
A recent study by Edison and Warnock (2003) provides a new measure of
restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic equities, which shows the intensity
of controls at a point in time as well as their evolution over time. The measure, dis-
cussed in full detail in their article and used in cross-sectional work of Ahearne,
Griever, and Warnock (2004), builds on the work of the International Finance
Corporation. In particular, for 29 emerging and frontier market economies, the IFC
publishes two indexes of equity prices, the Global (IFCG) and Investable (IFCI)
indexes. Since the IFCI index is composed of IFCG stocks minus the portion not
available to foreigners, the ratio of the market capitalizations of the IFCI to IFCG
Hali J.Edison,Michael W.Klein,Luca Antonio Ricci,and Torsten Sløk
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Table 5. Dates of Equity Market Liberalization of Emerging Market or
Frontier Market Countries
Country Liberalization Date Country Liberalization Date
Argentina 1989 Malaysia 1988
Bangladesh NL Mexico 1989
Brazil 1991 Morocco 1997
Chile 1992 Nigeria 1995
Colombia 1991 Pakistan 1991
Côte d’Ivoire NL Philippines 1991
Egypt 1997 Portugal 1986
Greece 1987 Sri Lanka 1992
India 1992 South Africa 1992
Indonesia 1989 Thailand 1987
Israel 1996 Trinidad and Tobago NL
Jamaica NL Tunisia NL
Jordan 1995 Turkey 1989
KenyaN LV enezuela 1990
Korea 1992 Zimbabwe 1993
Source: Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001).
Notes: Countries classified as emerging or frontier by the International Finance Corporation;
NL: Not Liberalized.indexes is a measure of the availability of a country’s stocks to foreigners, and one
minus the ratio is a measure of foreign ownership restrictions (Table 1, row 9). This
measure can be seen as an extension of the liberalization analysis of Bekaert and
Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000a). Indeed, the initial relaxation of controls shown
by the Edison-Warnock measure corresponds quite well with the Bekaert-Harvey
liberalization date.13 This new measure provides additional information, giving an
indication of the extent of the liberalization and its evolution over time. It shows
that international financial liberalizations can be gradual—a point also made in
Bekaert and Harvey (1995).
Quantitative Measures
An alternative to the practice discussed above, of constructing indicators from pub-
lished regulations, is to derive quantitative measures of the limits placed on capital
account transactions from the values of economic variables. There are three differ-
ent sets of variables that researchers have considered in this vein: national saving
rates paired with national investment rates, interest rate differentials, and interna-
tional capital flows. While at first blush it may seem preferable to use actual per-
formance rather than published regulations to gauge the restrictiveness of capital
controls, we will see that, as with rules-based measures, there are conceptual and
practical challenges associated with the use of these quantitative measures.
To the best of our knowledge, neither a comparison of national saving rates
with national investment rates nor interest rate differentials has been used in study-
ing the effects of capital account liberalization on long-run economic growth. There
have been some recent efforts to use actual capital flows to estimate the effects of
capital account restrictiveness on growth. Despite the limited use of these measures
in analyzing the links between capital account liberalization and growth, we discuss
each of these three sets of measures, since they have been used to gauge the extent
of capital account restrictions across countries and across time periods.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) published a study that was quite influential, in part
because it was one of the first efforts to measure quantitatively the extent of capital
mobility across a broad range of countries. They analyzed the behavior of savings
and investment in a number of countries to measure the “true” degree of capital
mobility, arguing that the degree of correlation between the two series was a good
indicator of impediments to capital movements. In any particular year, savings
matches investment in a country with stringent capital account restrictions, while
there need not be a link between savings and investment in a country with free cap-
ital mobility. Feldstein and Horioka found that, over the period 1960–74, as well as
over the three five-year subperiods making up this 15-year period, average saving
rates and average investment rates were highly positively correlated. Based on this
finding, they concluded that there were significant impediments to capital move-
ments.14 But this conclusion has been criticized, since the saving and investment
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13The liberalization dates in Henry (2000a) are somewhat earlier for some emerging markets, primar-
ily those for which country funds existed in the mid-1980s.
14Montiel (1996) used the Feldstein-Horioka method to assess capital mobility by using results of the
industrial countries as a benchmark to assess the degree of capital mobility for emerging markets.rates of a country may be highly correlated, even if that country has no restrictions
on international capital flows.15
Another set of quantitative measures of capital mobility includes onshore-
offshore interest rate differentials and deviations from covered interest rate parity.
Unlike stock market returns or other quantitative measures, short-term interest rates
can be analyzed without first transforming them in model-specific ways. However,
data availability restricts this method to a limited number of countries.
Recently, efforts have been made to gauge the extent of capital mobility through
the use of actual capital inflows and outflows, either as a percentage of GDP (as used
by Kraay, 1998, Table 1, row 10) or as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), by using
an annual measure of portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities as a
percentage of GDP as a long-run indicator of financial openness (see IMF, 2001;
Chanda, 2001; O’Donnell, 2001; and Edison and others, 2002, Table 1, row 11).
These measures are analogous to measures of trade openness and can be thought
of in a similar manner. For example, like the level of trade openness, which is typ-
ically calculated as the sum of imports and exports over GDP, the Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti measure is a good indicator of openness at a point in time. But both the
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti measure, and that of Kraay, may fluctuate from year to
year, since capital flows are endogenous and there can be large valuation adjust-
ments as a result of, say, a large swing in equity values (Eichengreen, 2001).
However, changes in these measures over longer periods are likely to be indica-
tive of changes in openness. In the subsequent section, this stock measure will
be referred to as the openness measure.16
Comparisons of Rules-Based and Quantitative Measures of Capital
Account Liberalization17
Figure 1 highlights the relationship between measures of capital account restric-
tiveness based on rules and one based on capital flows. Specifically, this figure
shows the time-series behavior of a rule-based measure, related to the restrictions
on capital flows as reported to the IMF by national authorities, and a measure of
capital account openness based on the estimated stocks of gross foreign assets and
liabilities as a ratio of GDP.
In industrial countries, the behavior of the two measures is similar and con-
firms that these countries have become considerably more open over time. A par-
ticularly rapid decline in controls occurred during the 1980s, when the members
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15For example, Obstfeld (1986) showed that, even with perfect capital mobility, saving and investment
might be highly correlated just because of the types of shocks hitting an economy. He also demonstrated
that the saving-investment correlations were higher for large countries than for small countries, a result one
would expect to find if there was free capital mobility and outcomes in large countries influencing world-
wide economic conditions. A different criticism of Feldstein and Horioka’s conclusions concerning the
extent of capital mobility based on saving-investment correlations comes from Bayoumi (1990), who shows
that this correlation may just reflect efforts by governments to target the current account.
16Clearly, this openness measure does not just capture the restrictiveness of capital controls, but also
the impact of all other factors influencing the level of capital flows, such as the nature of domestic finan-
cial markets.
17Parts of this section are adapted from the IMF’s October 2001 World Economic Outlook.CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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Figure 1. Summary of Measures of Capital Account Opennessof the European Community (now called the European Union) liberalized capital
controls. Following this, there was a dramatic rise in cross-border capital flows.
Among industrial countries, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom appear to have the most unfettered international capital flows, based on the
estimated stocks of gross foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of national
income.
In developing countries, the story is more complex. In general, both measures
suggest a less dramatic shift toward liberalization and openness than in industrial
countries. For the developing countries as a whole, the rules-based restriction mea-
sure suggests that, after a period of liberalization in the 1970s, the trend toward
openness reversed in the 1980s. Liberalization resumed in the early 1990s, but the
pace has been relatively slow; the rules-based measure indicates that the current
level of the indicator on average is only at the same level as it was in the late 1970s.
By comparison, the capital account openness measure based on the estimated stocks
of gross foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio of GDP shows a modest decline in
openness to capital flows during the early 1970s, followed by a moderate increase
in the 1980s and a sharp acceleration in the early 1990s.
II. Review of Literature on Capital Account 
Liberalization and Growth18
Economic theory suggests a number of benefits that may accompany capital
account liberalization. Open capital accounts can foster a more efficient allocation
of resources, provide opportunities for risk diversification, and help promote finan-
cial development. But there is also a good deal of skepticism concerning the bene-
fits of capital mobility.
While analysis of the costs of capital account liberalization have been limited,
there is a large and growing literature that tests the potential benefits of capital
account liberalization through its influence on long-run growth and development,
by directly investigating the empirical relationship between capital account liberal-
ization and economic growth. Almost all of these studies augment a basic growth
model that includes variables such as the level of schooling, investment, population
growth, and the level of GDP in the initial year with a measure of capital account
liberalization.
Table 6 presents an overview of these studies of the effects of capital account
liberalization on growth. Each row of this table presents information on one study.
The columns of the table offer information on the country coverage, the indicator
of liberalization, the estimation techniques, and the general result of the studies.
The information presented in Table 6 indicates that there is a wide divergence
in results across studies. This may reflect a number of differences in these studies.
First, the country coverage is different across studies, with some authors analyz-
ing industrial countries, others developing countries, and others a mixture of the
Hali J.Edison,Michael W.Klein,Luca Antonio Ricci,and Torsten Sløk
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18Financial globalization is a vast and complex topic. Not surprisingly, there have been a number of
papers written on this topic that are closely related to the work being surveyed. See, for example, the recent
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.two. Second, there are differences in the sample period, which may be particularly
important for developing countries given the recent nature of many capital account
liberalizations. Third, the applied methodology (cross-sectional, time series, or
panel) and the estimation technique (ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental
variables (IV), or generalized method of moments (GMM)) differ across studies.
Also, many of the authors of these studies recognize the potential for reverse
causality and attempt to address it using instrumental variable estimation.19
We next survey these studies in more detail, beginning with work that offers
support for the hypothesis that capital account liberalization promotes economic
growth and then turning to studies that cast some doubt on this relationship.
Supporting Evidence of Capital Account Liberalization on Growth
Quinn’s (1997) is one of the first studies to identify a positive result between capi-
tal account liberalization and growth. Quinn augments the set of variables included
in a standard growth regression with either a variable representing his indicator of
the change in financial openness (described above) or the change in a broader mea-
sure of openness.20 The change in the financial openness variable and the change in
the broader openness variable are calculated by subtracting the 1958 value of the
index from its 1988 value. Quinn’s empirical estimates suggest that the change in
capital account liberalization has a strongly significant effect on the growth in real
GDP per capita in his cross section of 58 countries over the period 1960 to 1989. It
is hard to disentangle the separate effects of financial openness and a broader mea-
sure of openness in Quinn’s results because he does not include a regression with
both of these indicators. Therefore, to the extent that the change in financial open-
ness is correlated with the change in the openness of trade in goods and services,
the finding of a significant effect of the change in capital account liberalization on
growth may reflect the correlation of changes in restrictions on the capital account
and the current account.
Klein and Olivei (1999) find a positive effect of capital account liberalization
on growth among industrial countries, but they do not find evidence that capital
account liberalization promotes growth in nonindustrial countries. This study fol-
lows a slightly different strategy than does other research in this area by first focus-
ing on the role of capital account liberalization on financial development and then
considering the effect of financial development on growth. Klein and Olivei regress
the change in financial depth on the capital account liberalization indicator Share
described above (along with other standard regressors) over the period 1986 to
1995. They find a significant effect of capital account liberalization on the change
in financial depth in the cross section of 82 developed and developing nations. This
significant result seems to be because of the presence of the OECD countries in the
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19For example, a country with weak economic performance might choose to adopt capital controls,
and there is a danger in such a case to interpret incorrectly that the country’s low growth depends on those
controls.
20The base regression includes also initial GDP per capita, investment as a share of GDP, population
growth, and secondary school enrollment rates.sample. Klein and Olivei show that capital account liberalization significantly
affects the change in financial depth in a sample consisting of the 20 OECD coun-
tries but not in a sample of the non-OECD countries, nor in a narrower non-OECD
sample of 18 Latin American countries, a group that had a relatively high incidence
of capital account liberalizations. They also estimate a growth model that includes
the change in financial depth as regressor and find that financial development is a
significant determinant of growth per capita. Klein and Olivei conclude that the
beneficial effects of capital account liberalization, at least with respect to promot-
ing financial depth, are achieved only in an environment where there is a constel-
lation of other institutions that can usefully support the changes brought about by
the free flow of capital. Bailliu (2000) also finds that capital account liberalization
spurs growth by promoting financial development.
This conjecture, that the growth effects of capital account liberalization depend
upon the level of development of an economy, is supported by the results presented
in Edwards (2001). Edwards finds that both the Quinn level and the ∆Quinn vari-
ables are significantly associated with growth in per capita income in the 1980s for
a sample of about 60 countries, though his results are not robust when he instead
uses Share. Edwards estimates regressions using weighted least squares, with the
weights representing national income in 1985. He includes both the capital account
liberalization variables and an interactive term representing the product of the vari-
ables and the logarithm of income per capita in 1980. His estimates show a neg-
ative coefficient on capital account openness and a positive coefficient on the
openness-income interactive term. This suggests that capital account openness
detracts from growth for countries at lower levels of income but promotes growth
in industrial countries and in the richer emerging market countries.
Edwards’ methodology is scrutinized in Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz
(2001). They question why Edwards obtains such strong results while other studies
(cited below) fail to find any significant effect of capital account liberalization on
growth. They point to a number of potential reasons for this discrepancy. They ques-
tion whether Quinn’s measures, representing capital account openness in 1973 and
1988 only, are appropriate for the period Edwards studies. They also note that
weighting observations by 1985 per capita GDP means that rich countries have
much more influence in the regressions than do poor countries. They also raise ques-
tions concerning the exogeneity of instruments used for capital account liberaliza-
tion and the exclusion of other potentially relevant measures of openness, such as the
openness of the current account, which may be correlated with capital account open-
ness. Estimates by Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz suggest that Edwards’ results
may be sensitive to a variety of factors, and, therefore, they conclude that there is lit-
tle evidence that capital account liberalization has more favorable effects in high-
income and middle-income countries than in poorer developing countries.
But Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz do find some support for differences in
the effect of capital account liberalization across countries, depending on the degree
of macroeconomic stability. They introduce two capital account interaction terms,
multiplying the Quinn openness measure by both the Sachs-Warner (1995) openness
measure and the black market premium. They find that the interaction term repre-
senting the product of capital account openness and the black market premium is
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Warner openness measure and capital account openness, is not significant. They
interpret this to mean that countries that open their capital accounts grow faster, but
only if they first eliminate the black market premium.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) (henceforth BHL) examine the impact
of stock market liberalization on economic growth. As previous researchers have
done, they begin their analysis by augmenting the standard set of growth model
variables with their variable indicating stock market liberalization. To maximize
the time-series content in their regression, they use a moving average panel data
method.21 In general, BHL find that financial liberalization leads to a 1 percent
increase in annual per capita GDP growth over a five-year period and that this
effect is statistically significant. BHL investigate the robustness of this result with
respect to alternative sets of liberalization dates, different country groupings, and
different time horizons for measuring economic growth.
These results, along with those of Quinn, appear to be the strongest evidence
supporting the hypothesis in published research that capital account liberalization
promotes growth among developing countries. But, as discussed in more detail
below, a recent paper by Klein (2003) provides evidence that capital account open-
ness significantly contributes to growth among middle-income countries but not
among poor countries or the richest countries.
Klein allows for a quadratic interaction between initial income and indicators of
capital account openness (and thus nests the specification of Arteta, Eichengreen,
and Wyplosz, 2001) as well as a quadratic interaction between indicators of govern-
ment quality (which are highly correlated with income) and indicators of capital
account openness. The finding that middle-income countries systematically benefit
from capital inflows is consistent with the view of Rodrik (1999) that countries
require adequate institutions, regulatory policies, and supervisory agencies to bene-
fit from capital flows.
O’Donnell (2001) and Chanda (2001) also consider the possibility of differing
effects of capital account openness across countries. O’Donnell examines the
impact of capital account liberalization using both IMF rules-based measure and
a quantitative-based measure of financial openness. Using a rather standard setup,
he finds that the rules-based measure tends to be too coarse an indicator of the
degree of capital account liberalization, as it does not take into account the nature of
different types of controls. However, using the quantitative measure, he finds that
capital account liberalization does seem to speed up economic growth. However,
like other researchers, he finds that the benefits to all countries are not equal.
Chanda (2001) suggests that the impact of open capital accounts may vary with
the level of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in the society, a proxy for the num-
ber of interest groups. In particular, he finds that capital controls lead to greater
inefficiencies and lower growth among countries with a high degree of ethnic and
linguistic heterogeneity.
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21This means that they create overlapping data and therefore have to deal with the resulting moving
average error component by adjusting their standard errors.Studies Not Supporting the Hypothesis That 
Liberalization Promotes Growth
Several studies have found no correlation between openness and growth. In fact,
one of the first efforts to determine whether capital account liberalization pro-
motes growth using a cross section of countries was Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti
(1995), although this was not the main focus of their paper. This study considers
average growth of per capita income for five nonoverlapping five-year periods
between 1966 and 1989. Their sample includes 61 countries, although, with 181
observations in one set of regressions and 238 in another, not every country
appears in each of the five subperiods. The authors regress five-year growth rates
on Share and comparable measures that capture the presence of current account
controls (CurrAcct) and a multiple exchange rate system (MultEx) from Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. In addition they include variables such
as initial income, political variables, and the level of schooling. The three variables
Share, CurrAcct, and MultEx enter as predicted values from instrumental variable
regressions using lagged values as the instruments. Their results do not support the
hypothesis that capital account liberalization promotes growth. In some cases,
capital account controls enter with a positive sign (that is, Share enters negatively),
while the indicator of current account controls sometimes enters with a negative
sign (CurrAcct is positive).22
Rodrik (1998), in a widely cited paper, also casts doubt on the effect of capital
account liberalization on growth. In a sample that includes almost 100 countries,
developing as well as developed, he finds no significant effect of capital account
liberalization, as measured by Share, on the percentage change in real income per
capita over the period 1975 to 1989 in growth regressions that also include initial
per capita income, initial secondary-school enrollment rate, an index of the quality
of governmental institutions, and regional dummy variables. Likewise, he finds no
relationship between capital account liberalization and investment-to-income, or
between capital account liberalization and inflation. Eichengreen (2001) offers sev-
eral possible reasons for different results of Quinn’s and Rodrik’s papers, including
the fact that Quinn’s sample includes fewer developing countries than Rodrik’s, the
smaller proportion of years in Quinn’s study representing the “lost decade” of the
1980s, and differences in the capital account indicator. The regressions presented in
the next section allow us to explore the role of these potential sources of the differ-
ences in the two studies.
Kraay (1998) also finds no significant relationship, using a variety of measures
of capital account openness, including Share, Quinn’s capital account openness indi-
cator (in levels, with values from 0 to 4), and a measure based on actual net capital
flows. Each of these measures is associated with a different sample size. His regres-
sions take the form of cross sections, with one observation per country, where the
dependent variable is the growth in output between 1985 and 1997. He uses both
OLS and an approach in which the capital account liberalization variables are instru-
mented by their own past values. He fails to find a significant effect of Share or the
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22See their Table 4, p. 537.Quinn indicator on growth, but, when these indicators are interacted with the aver-
age balance of the financial account (from the balance of payments statistics), he
does find some significant effects.
Finally, Edison and others (2002) also find little evidence of a relationship
between capital account liberalization and growth. Using a variety of economet-
ric techniques and a new data set focusing on quantitative measures rather than rule-
based measures, they find that financial integration does not accelerate economic
growth per se, even when controlling for particular economic, financial, institu-
tional, and policy characteristics. They do, however, find that international financial
integration is positively associated with real per capita GDP, educational attainment,
banking sector development, stock market development, the law-and-order tradition
of the country, and government integrity (low levels of government corruption).
III. Empirical Investigation
The literature reviewed in the previous section offers a diverse set of results con-
cerning the effect of capital account liberalization on growth. The discussion in
that section also suggests that a direct comparison of these studies is difficult since
they vary along a number of dimensions, including indicator of capital account
openness or stock market liberalization, countries included, time period studied, and
econometric technique employed.
In this section, we attempt to reconcile some of the differences in the literature
by presenting regressions that capture the essential components of five of the stud-
ies we cite above. An exercise of strict replication of these studies would not be espe-
cially useful since it would not foster an effort to search for the source of differences
across studies. Therefore, what we do instead is vary the indicator of capital account
openness or stock market liberalization, the time period studied, and the set of coun-
tries in regressions that share a common regressand and a common set of other
regressors.23We show, in the first subsection that—using this approach—we are able
to replicate the main result in the five studies on which we focus.
As mentioned in the introduction, the real goal of this effort is not merely repli-
cation but also comparison. In the next subsection, we examine the robustness of
the results presented in the first subsection by varying the sample and the regres-
sors. We find that none of the specifications continue to offer a significant effect of
capital account liberalization on growth once we include government reputation as
a regressor. This confirms and extends the results presented by Rodrik (1998).
But, as we also mention in the introduction, we are able to go beyond this result
to find countries for which there is a significant effect of capital account openness
and stock market liberalization on economic growth. We present, in the third sub-
section, “Resolution,” results that draw on recent work by one of the authors of this
survey. Klein (2003) finds that allowing for a quadratic interaction between income
per capita and the Quinn or the Share indicators of capital account openness, or the
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23Of course, while all regressions include, for example, the regressors’initial income and initial invest-
ment, the actual value of these regressors will vary as the time period corresponding to the replication
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Table 7. Replication
(Growth regressions for different capital account liberalization measures1)
1: Quinn 2: AEW1 3: AEW2 4: G-MF 5: BHL 6: Rodrik
ln (initial inc.) −0.28 −0.27 −0.40 −0.35 −0.16 −0.27
(s.e.) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08)
ln (initial Educ.) 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.22 −0.002 0.07
(s.e.) (0.23) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.09) (0.12)
Av’g Initial Inv. 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.019 0.007
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.01) (0.01) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009)
∆pop −1.25 −1.43 −1.14 −2.40 −1.79 −0.22
(s.e.) (0.68) (0.53) (0.55) (0.55) (0.42) (0.88)
Africa dummy −0.78 −0.45 −0.53 −0.25 −0.47 −0.18













R2 0.52 0.45 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.53
Sample period 1970–89 1973–92 1973–92 1970–89 1980–95 1976–89
No. of observations 53 55 55 49 89 73
BHL indicator of stock market liberalization, revives the significance of the effect
of these indicators on economic growth, even when including government reputa-
tion as a regressor. Interestingly, the set of countries for which growth is signifi-
cantly affected by capital account openness or stock market liberalization includes
middle-income countries but not poor countries or rich countries.
Replication
Table 7 presents our efforts at replication. Each column in this table reports the
results of a cross-country growth regression in which one observation represents
the experience of one country over the time period listed in the penultimate row of
the table. The regressand, in each case, is the change in the logarithm of real GDP
per capita over the period listed in the table. The regressors common across all
specifications in this table include a standard set of variables used in growth
regressions: the logarithm of the level of real per capita income in the first year of
the sample, the average annual level of investment to GDP for the five years sur-CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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Table 7. (concluded)
Overall effect of capital account liberalization evaluated at the ith GDP percentile:
25th Percentile (s.e.) 0.09
(0.09)
50th Percentile (s.e.) 0.15
(0.07)
75th Percentile (s.e.) 0.25
(0.10)
Sources: 1Quinn, Dennis, 1997, “The Correlates of Change in International Financial
Regulation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 (September), pp. 531–51; Arteta, Carlos,
Barry Eichengreen, and Charles Wyplosz, 2001, “On the Growth Effects of Capital Account
Liberalization” (unpublished; Berkeley, California: University of California); Grilli, Vittorio, and
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, “Economic Effects and Structural Determinants of Capital
Controls,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 517–51; Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and
Christian Lundblad, 2001, “Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?” NBER Working Paper No.
8245 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research); Rodrik, Dani, 1998,
“Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?” in Stanley Fischer, and others, Should the IMF Pursue
Capital Account Convertibility? Essays in International Finance, No. 207 (Princeton: International
Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University), May.
Notes: All estimates using OLS with robust standard errors; regressions include a constant (not
reported); endogenous variable = growth in ln real per capita income over sample period; ln (initial
inc.) = ln real per capita income in first year of sample; ln (Educ.) = ln (secondary-school enrollment
rate) in 1976 (for lack of data, the first year of each sample period could not be used; however, the
cross-section variation is likely to be the same); Av’g Initial Inv. = average investment to GDP ratio
over the five-year period around the first year of the sample; ∆pop = population growth over sample
period; Africa dummy = dummy variable for African countries; share = proportion of years with open
capital accounts over sample period, from IMF’s AREAER; Quinn88 = 0 to 4 measure of capital
account openness in 1988 and ∆Quinn58–88 = difference in 0 to 4 measure of capital account openness
between 1958 and 1988, both from Quinn (1997); BHL80–95 = Proportion of years between 1980 and
1995 with liberalized stock market, using dates of stock market liberalization from Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad (2001). Three rows labeled “Percentile” evaluate sum of coefficients on “Quinn88” and
on “Quinn88 × ln(GDP per Capita1980)” for values of GDP per capita at 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile,
respectively; GovRep. = Knack and Keefer (1995) measure of degree to which governments do not
repudiate contracts; range is 1–10; and larger values indicate government less likely to repudiate con-
tract; bold denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 or less; italic denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 to 0.10.
rounding the initial year of the time period, the logarithm of the secondary school
enrollment rate in 1976, the growth rate of the country’s population over the sam-
ple period, and a dummy variable for African countries.
We focus on five studies discussed in Section II: Quinn (1997) (replicated in
column 1 of Table 7); Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001) (columns 2 and 3);
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) (column 4); Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001)
(column 5); and Rodrik (1998) (column 6). The capital account openness indica-
tors used in these regressions reported in columns 1–4 and 6 match those used by
the respective studies. The stock market liberalization indicator used in the regres-
sion reported in column 5 draws from the data presented by Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad, as discussed in Section II. The samples chosen, in terms of period andcountries included, is as close as possible to the ones in the original studies.24
Replications of the two studies that employ Quinn’s measure of capital account
openness are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 7. The regression reported
in column 1 replicates the work of Quinn. The regressor in this case is the differ-
ence between the value of Quinn’s 0–4 indicator of capital account openness in
1988 and its value in 1958. Quinn uses this change in the value of openness in his
work, and, as is the case in his research, we find a positive and significant effect of
this variable on the economic growth for the 55 countries he studies. Arteta,
Eichengreen, and Wyplosz use the level of Quinn’s 0–4 indicator of capital account
openness in 1988 rather than its change. We are able to replicate their finding of a
significant effect of this variable on economic growth in the regression reported in
column 2. These authors are also interested in the manner in which the effect of
capital account openness on growth varies with income. In column 3 we replicate
this effort by including, as a regressor, the interaction between the Quinn 1988
indicator and the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980. We report the partial
derivative of growth with respect to the Quinn 1988 indicator for the country at the
25th percentile of income, the 50th percentile of income, and the 75th percentile of
income. The results presented in column 3 suggest that there is a significant effect
of capital account openness on rich countries but not on poorer countries. This is
somewhat at odds with the results presented by Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz,
who find, in their words, “scant evidence” of an effect of capital account liberal-
ization on growth for richer countries.
The regression reported in column 4 of Table 7 replicates one of the central
results reported in Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995). As in their work, this regres-
sion fails to offer a significant effect of capital account openness, as measured
by the IMF AREAER indicator Share.25 Column 5 of Table 7 presents a regres-
sion to consider the effect of stock market liberalization on economic growth.
This regression draws on the dating of stock market liberalizations by Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) discussed in the previous section. While the cross-
sectional approach we use differs from the one undertaken by those authors, we
find a similar result: that economic growth is positively and significantly associ-
ated with stock market liberalization over the period 1980 to 1995 for the nearly
100 countries studied.
Like Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, Rodrik (1998) uses the Share measure of cap-
ital account openness but has a wider country coverage and, more importantly,
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24The earliest data we have is from 1970, while the Quinn and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti studies draw
data from a slightly earlier starting point. Recall also that the regressions in both the Quinn and Rodrik
studies matched the cross-sectional form of those presented in Table 7, while time series-cross section
studies were used by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, who had nonoverlapping five-year periods, and Arteta,
Eichengreen, and Wyplosz, who had pooled data using three nonoverlapping periods for each country.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad used overlapping observations in their cross-country study. Furthermore,
the results below are generally robust to whether the estimation method is OLS or IV.
25The regression reported in column 4 covers a set of countries that closely correspond to those in the
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti study. Note, however, that in a sample of almost 100 countries, we found a sig-
nificant and positive effect of capital account liberalization on growth.includes the variable GovRep. This measure, developed by Knack and Keefer
(1995), draws on information from various volumes of the International Country
Risk Guide. The variable potentially ranges from 1 to 10, with larger values indi-
cating that a government is less likely to repudiate contracts. For most countries,
the variable reflects reputation in 1982. The regression result presented in column
6 includes a highly significant effect of GovRep on growth but, with the inclusion
of this variable, no significant effect of capital account openness. These results
match closely those presented by Rodrik.26
Thus, overall, we are able to replicate the main results found in the five studies
we consider. The real advantage of this exercise, however, is that it allows us to move
forward and consider, in a consistent manner, the robustness of these results when
the sample is adjusted or when an additional regressor is introduced.
Robustness
Table 8 revisits five of the six regressions presented in Table 7 to consider the
robustness of those results. Slightly modifying the specifications presented in
Table 7 through the inclusion of government reputation as a regressor eliminates the
significance of capital account openness or stock market liberalization on growth, no
matter which indicator is used. Thus, in this context, the point made by Rodrik about
a regression that uses the IMF AREAER measure applies to regressions that employ
other measures as well.27
The first column of Table 8 reconsiders the result presented by Quinn (1997)
by including the government reputation indicator in a regression that otherwise
matches that presented in column 1 of Table 7. Comparing the results in the first
column of each table, we see that the inclusion of the government reputation indi-
cator causes the significance of the indicator of capital account liberalization to
decrease, with its p-value rising from 0.018 when government reputation is not
included in the regression to 0.101 when it is included.
The next two columns of Table 8 augment the Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz
regressions presented in Table 7 by including the government reputation indicator.
The Quinn capital account openness indicator is no longer significant, whether it is
interacted with income or not.
The fourth column of Table 8 shows that the coefficient on the Share indicator
of capital account openness continues to be statistically insignificant when govern-
ment reputation is included as a regressor. The fifth column of this table shows that
the coefficient on the BHL indicator of stock market liberalization also is insignifi-
cant when government reputation is included as a regressor (the p-value is 0.353), in
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26This measure, government reputation, is closely linked to quality of institutions. Recently, the liter-
ature on growth and institutions has reported that institutions play an important role in economic perfor-
mance. See, for example,Acemoglu and others (2003); Easterly and Levine (2003); Rodrik, Subramanian,
and Trebbi (2002); and IMF (2003).
27Note that the regressions in Table 8 may include a smaller sample than the corresponding regres-
sions in Table 7 because of the limited availability of the government reputation measure.Hali J.Edison,Michael W.Klein,Luca Antonio Ricci,and Torsten Sløk
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Table 8. Robustness
(Growth regressions for different capital account liberalization measures1)
Original Study  1:Quinn  2:AEW1 3:AEW2 4:G-MF 5:BHL 
Change  from  Include Include Include Include Include 
Table 7 Specif. GovRep. GovRep. GovRep. GovRep. GovRep.
ln (initial inc.) −0.43 −0.32 −0.28 −0.45 −0.30
(s.e.) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07)
ln (initial Educ.) 0.05 −0.08 −0.07 0.12 0.05
(s.e.) (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.11)
Av’g Initial Inv. 0.019 0.034 0.03 0.029 0.015
(s.e.) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.008)
∆pop −0.48 −0.45 −0.54 −0.54 −0.87
(s.e.) (0.59) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.57)
Africa dummy −0.97 −0.62 −0.60 −0.44 −0.70











GovRep. 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.22
(s.e.) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
R2 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.77
Sample period 1970–89 1973–92 1973–92 1970–89 1980–95
No. of observations 52 53 53 45 71
Overall effect of capital account liberalization evaluated at the ith GDP percentile:
25th Percentile (s.e.) 0.09
(0.07)
50th Percentile (s.e.) 0.07
(0.05)
75th Percentile (s.e.) 0.03
(0.08)
Sources: 1Quinn, Dennis, 1997, “The Correlates of Change in International Financial
Regulation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 (September), pp. 531–51; Arteta, Carlos,
Barry Eichengreen, and Charles Wyplosz, 2001, “On the Growth Effects of Capital Account
Liberalization,” (unpublished; Berkeley, California: University of California); Grilli, Vittorio, and
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, “Economic Effects and Structural Determinants of Capital
Controls,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 517–5; and Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and
Christian Lundblad, 2001, “Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?” NBER Working Paper No.
8245 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Notes: See Table 7 for definition of variables. All estimates using OLS with robust standard
errors; regressions include a constant term (not reported); definition of variables described in notes
to Table 7; bold denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 or less; italic denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05
to 0.10.contrast to the results presented in Table 7, column 5, where the coefficient on this
indicator has the p-value of 0.004.28
In summary, the results presented in Table 8 suggest that the inclusion of an
indicator of institutional quality, such as government reputation, diminishes the sig-
nificance of the effect of capital account liberalization on economic growth, which
is consistent with the original findings of Rodrik (1998).
Resolution
The results presented in Table 8 are consistent with the lack of a significant effect
of capital account openness or stock market liberalization on economic growth,
across different indicators, across different samples, and regardless of whether the
effect of capital account openness is allowed to vary with income. However, if one
allows for a more flexible specification, there appears to be some evidence that
capital account openness and stock market liberalization do, in fact, significantly
contribute to economic growth for middle-income countries though not for poor
countries or the wealthiest countries.
The results reported here draw heavily on Klein (2003), who shows that a flexi-
ble specification yields a significant effect of capital account openness or stock mar-
ket liberalization on economic growth. We highlight the results drawn from that paper
that are based on a cross-section regression, which takes the following specification:
where ∆lnY1976–1995,i is the change in the natural logarithm of real per capita income
between 1976 and 1995 of country i, Ki is an indicator of capital account openness
of country i (the IMF’s AREAER-based Share1976–95, the 0–4 measure Quinn1982,o r
the stock market liberalization indicator drawn from the work of Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad, BHL1980–95), lnY1976,i is the natural logarithm of real per capita
income in 1976 for country i. Zi is a matrix of control variables that includes
GovRep, the indicator of government reputation, as well as variables standard in
cross-country growth regressions, including lnY1976,i, the logarithm of the sec-
ondary school enrollment rate, the average rate of investment to GDP over the years
1974 to 1978, the growth rate of the population between 1976 and 1995, and a
dummy variable for African countries. We focus on the estimated partial derivative
of growth with respect to capital account openness, Bi,w here
The subscript for Bi reflects the fact that the estimated effect of capital account open-
ness on growth varies across countries because of their differences in income.29
Bi =+ + ββ β 12 3
2 lnY lnY 1976,i 1976,i .
∆lnY Z lnY lnY 1976 1995,i i 1976,i 1976,i − = ′ ++ × () +× () + βββ β ε 012 3
2 KK K ii i i ,
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28Given the large change in the sample size between the regressions presented in column 5 of Tables
7 and 8, it is worth noting that running the regression with the specification of that in column 5 of Table 7
but with the sample used in column 5 of Table 8 (which has 71 observations) yields a coefficient on the
BHL indicator of stock market liberalization of 0.48 with a p-value of 0.031.
29Unlike the specifications presented in the previous tables, with the 1988 value of the Quinn indica-
tor of capital account openness, we use the 1982 value of this indicator, since this is more representative
of the initial conditions with respect to capital account liberalization.Table 9 summarizes the results from estimates that employ the three indicators
of capital account openness mentioned above. The results for nonlinear effects
suggest that a group of countries exists for which there is a significant effect of
financial openness on growth. Such countries are characterized by an intermediate
level of income at the beginning of the sample, which is likely to proxy for the ini-
tial level of development.
There is a significant estimated effect of financial openness on growth for one-
ninth of the countries in the sample when using the 1982 Quinn indicator of cap-
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Table 9. Resolution
(Growth regressions for different capital account liberalization measures1)
Capital Account Openness Indicator: K
Quinn82 Share BHL80–95
ln (initial inc.) −0.17 −0.29 −0.25
(s.e.) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
ln (initial Educ.) −0.04 0.10 0.03
(s.e.) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Av’g Initial Inv. 0.02 0.01 0.01
(s.e.) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆pop −0.72 −0.20 −0.26
(s.e.) (0.33) (0.45) (0.48)
Africa dummy −1.13 −0.58 −0.68
(s.e.) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
K −1.91 −10.14 −8.47
(s.e.) (1.44) (4.18) (3.75)
K*GDP 0.60 2.86 2.57
(s.e.) (0.35) (1.13) (0.98)
K*GDP2 −0.04 −0.20 −0.18
(s.e.) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06)
Gov. Rep. 0.25 0.30 0.25
(s.e.) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.82 0.77 0.79
Sample period 1976–95 1976–95 1976–95
No. of observations 54 73 71
GDP Percentile (s.e.): 25th 0.12 0.07 0.46
(0.09) (0.14) (0.32)
50th Percentile (s.e.) 0.13 0.29 0.61
(0.06) (0.13) (0.26)
75th Percentile (s.e.) 0.04 0.26 0.38
(0.07) (0.17) (0.18)
Sources: 1Quinn, Dennis, 1997, “The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation,”
American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 (September), pp. 531–51 and Bekaert, Geert, Campbell
Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 2001, “Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?” NBER Working
Paper No. 8245 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Notes: See Table 7 for definition of variables. All estimates using OLS with robust standard
errors; regressions include a constant term (not reported); definition of variables described in notes to
Table 7; bold denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 or less; italic denotes p-value of coefficient 0.05 to 0.10.ital account openness. These countries range, in 1976 per capita income, from
Malaysia to Mexico (which were at the 48th and 56th percentiles of initial income
in this sample, respectively; see Table 10). More than one-fifth of the countries in
the sample exhibit a significant estimated effect of capital account liberalization
on growth when using Share. The countries in this group have initial per capita
income that ranges from the 42nd percentile (Ecuador) to the 64th percentile
(Portugal). The regression with the largest group of countries in which there is a
significant estimated effect of liberalization on growth is the one using the
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad indicator of stock market liberalization. In this
case, almost two-fifths of the countries have an estimated significant effect, and
this set of countries ranges from Côte d’Ivoire, whose 1976 level of per capita
income is at the 38th percentile of the sample used in this regression, to Italy,
which was at the 76th percentile in 1976 per capita income.
These results seem to suggest that countries can benefit from capital account
liberalization when their level of development is not too primitive (as they would
lack the institutional structure necessary to fit liberalization in the growth engine)
or too advanced (as they would have already reaped the benefits).
IV. Conclusion
The consequences and desirability of capital account liberalization among devel-
oping countries is likely to remain a topic of debate for the foreseeable future.
People on one side of this debate will maintain that those countries that open up
to financial flows will set the stage for more rapid development. Those on the other
side will question the advantages actually conferred by capital account liberaliza-
tion and, furthermore, will argue that countries become more vulnerable to finan-
cial disruptions not of their own making when their governments relinquish
control over the inflow and outflow of capital.
In this paper we have surveyed which measures of capital account liberalization
have been employed, as well as what current research is able to tell us about the
consequences of capital account liberalization. We point out that while industrial
countries have largely liberalized their capital accounts and there has been some
movement toward more widespread capital account liberalization among developing
countries, the majority of developing countries retain controls over capital flows.
Different indicators of capital account openness offer a broadly consistent picture of
the pattern of liberalization.
The evidence presented in the literature on the effects of capital account open-
ness on economic growth is somewhat mixed. The exercise undertaken in this paper
replicates these results and, furthermore, shows that results using the specifications
employed in most existing studies fail to present a significant effect of capital
account openness on economic growth if the regressions also include an indicator of
government reputation. But we have also demonstrated that more recent results do
offer a consistent effect of capital account openness and stock market liberalization
on economic growth for middle-income countries, though not for poorer or richer
countries. In fact, we find that introducing nonlinear variables, such as the interaction
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nbetween GDP and capital account liberalization, turns out to give significant results.
Such findings may be a reason why different studies (each neglecting the nonlinear
nature of the relationship) find different results and may suggest that an intermedi-
ate level of development may be necessary for a country to benefit from capital
account liberalization.
Given the importance of this topic, the lack of a clear consensus in the literature,
and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that undertaking capital account liberaliza-
tion is more easily achieved than many other policies advocated to governments of
developing countries, it is very likely that the literature on the topic surveyed in this
paper will continue to expand. The concern that this research is hampered by a
strong set of variables reflecting capital account openness should be somewhat
allayed by the statistics presented in this paper showing a common cross-country
picture of capital account openness regardless of the (admittedly imperfect) indica-
tors that are employed. But, as better indicators are developed, and as we obtain a
longer time series that encompasses a wider range of experiences, we expect that our
understanding of this important topic will be refined.
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